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The "Battle We Lost 
at Home" Revisited 
Official Military Histories and the 
Battle of the St. Lawrence 
Roger Sarty 
Tie Importance of this conference* Is that It gathers together so many 
of the threads of the history and legacy 
of the St Lawrence battle. These threads 
include the memories of people who 
lived through the events and physical 
artifacts of the battle, treasures that are 
especially precious because, 60 years 
after the fact, memories are being 
extinguished, and many artifacts have already 
been lost. Among the artifacts are the traces the 
Second World War left on the landscape -
including notably the Mont Joli airport, and the 
naval base and fortifications at Gaspe. Durable 
as these remnants must have once seemed, they 
too have been greatly changed over time, by 
human intervention and by the erosion of the 
elements. Something that has changed much less 
is the geography and the environment of le bas 
St. Laurent and the gulf, which so greatly 
influenced the battle. The location of the 
conference here at Rimouski, close by the Bic 
Islands where convoys formed up and dispersed, 
and close by the western limits of U-boat hunting 
missions has enriched the understanding of the 
participants, and the value of the proceedings. 
* This paper was originally presented at the conference The 
Battle of the St. Lawrence: Impacts on the Gulf Population 
from the Second World War to the Present,' organized by the 
Musee Naval de Quebec, at Rimouski, Quebec, 8-11 May 
2002. Participants included members of the historical, 
museum, teaching, armed forces, and media communities, 
as well as local residents who lived through the events of 
1942. It is published here through the kind permission of 
M. Andre Kirouac, director of the Musee Naval de Quebec. 
The subject of the present paper is 
just one of the threads of the battle's 
legacy, the Government of Canada's 
official military histories of the battle. 
These comments are something of a 
progress report - what has been done 
and what is new. The remarks are 
intended to encourage interested people 
to use the official military histories as 
tools for further work. Although the histories 
are based on voluminous government and 
military records in Ottawa, and in British, 
American and German archives, the histories 
do not - and could not - capture the full human 
experience and meaning of the battle in this 
region. 
There were, and p e r h a p s still are , 
widespread perceptions that the St. Lawrence 
battle was an unknown event, 'The War Story 
Our Leaders Kept Quiet,' in the words of an 
important article that appeared in a national 
magazine in 1972.l These perceptions, the very 
opposite of the facts, demonstrate that historical 
awareness must be nurtured, by such means as 
the work of the present conference. 
When U-553 opened the St Lawrence 
campaign by sinking the merchant vessels Leto 
and Nicoya on the night of 11-12 May 1942, 
Angus L. Macdonald, minister of National 
Defence for Naval Services , broke his 
department 's own security regulations to 
announce the sinkings to the press and in 
Parliament the very next day. His actions cleared 
© Canadian Military History, Volume 12, Numbers 1& 2, Winter /Spr ing 2003, pp.41-50. 4 1 
1
Sarty: Official Military Histories and the Battle of the St. Lawrence
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003
the way for the national press immediately to 
run detailed articles that featured interviews with 
the survivors from the ships' crews who spoke 
bluntly about how the attacks had been a 
complete surprise: the naval shipping control 
authorities had not yet designated the St. 
Lawrence as a danger zone. There does not seem 
much doubt that Macdonald's action was 
politically motivated. The country had only 
weeks before been badly divided on linguistic 
lines in the plebiscite that asked the electorate 
to release the government from its promise not 
to send conscripted troops overseas; English-
speaking provinces had responded with an 
overwhelming 'yes' and Quebec with an equally 
resounding 'no.' The government therefore 
believed that Kapitanleutnant Thurmann, the 
commander of U-553, had unwittingly struck a 
blow for Canadian national unity. French-
speaking Canadians might see that the war was 
no longer a remote event that had no direct 
impact on them, and Eng l i sh - speak ing 
Canadians might understand that there were 
good military reasons to keep conscripted troops 
in Canada.2 
During the renewed U-boat attacks in the 
summer and fall of 1942, the navy delayed the 
release of information, so that the enemy would 
not have confirmation of success soon enough 
to allow the German U-boat command quickly 
to deploy additional submarines to the area. The 
government, however, broke its own rules again 
when U-69 sank the Newfoundland ferry 
Caribou, with heavy loss of civilian life, on the 
night of 13-14 October 1942. Rumours might 
wildly magnify the scope of the disaster, causing 
widespread panic and unnecessary further 
suffering among the families of victims and 
survivors : the navy allowed the p res s 
immediately to publish full details 
At this same time, Adelard Godbout, premier 
of Quebec, warned the federal prime minister, 
William Lyon Mackenzie King, that losses around 
Gaspe and in le bas St. Laurent were causing 
serious alarm in those regions. Godbout's advice 
followed repeated demands from federal 
Members of Parliament from the region for fuller 
information and assurances the government 
would organize more effective defence measures. 
During the winter of 1942-3, therefore, the 
government released in Parliament the names 
of all 21 ships that had been sunk in the St 
Lawrence.3 Macdonald and C.G. Power, the 
minister of National Defence for Air, also 
responded to the most alarmist reports that 
defences were non-existent or ill-organized, with 
detailed information that showed these to be 
rumours without foundation. In the one instance 
in which the armed forces had been slow to 
respond to an accurate report by a shorewatcher 
of a U-boat off Gaspe, the government frankly 
acknowledged that errors had been made. A 
large government-sponsored book, Canada and 
the War at Sea,4 published in 1944 by the 
popular authors Stephen Leacock and Leslie 
Roberts, featured a chapter on The Battle of the 
Gulf.' It contains a reasonably full account of 
the operations, of the alarm in the St Lawrence 
region, and of the government's policy of 
openness. 
In 1946 the navy issued a press release that 
gave fuller military particulars about the battle 
of the St Lawrence.5 The first official history of 
the navy to appear, in 1950, fleshed out 
additional detail, and classed the operations in 
1942 as 'an almost unmitigated defeat for 
Canada, 'but allowed that '[i]t was a defeat 
deliberately and unavoidably accepted.... 
Adequate defence of the St. Lawrence would have 
meant the recall of many Canadian ships from 
the Atlantic; and such re-disposition would have 
been of far more benefit to Germany than all the 
achievements of Hartwig [the most successful 
U-boat commander in the St Lawrence] and his 
companions. '6 A further official volume by 
Gilbert Tuckerl, completed in 1948 but not 
published until 1952, included an analysis of 
how the government's decision to close the St 
Lawrence to overseas shipping in the fall of 1942 
diminished the effectiveness of Canada 's 
transportation system, with losses to carrying 
capacity of strategic material more important 
than the actual losses of ships.7 
As a result of the early production of the 
naval official histories, maritime aspects of 
Second World War had a low priority in the 
Department of National Defence historical 
programme until the late 1970s to 1980s. At that 
time the historians working on the Royal 
Canadian Air Force history project began to 
investigate the important role of aircraft in the 
protection of shipping during the Battle of the 
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Atlantic. Preliminary work on the St Lawrence 
revealed a much larger story than anyone had 
suspected, and Dr. W.A.B. Douglas, Director of 
History, authorized one of the historians to 
devote full time work to the St. Lawrence story 
for the better part of a year. The result of this 
research was the full chapter on the St Lawrence 
in Dr. Douglas' The Creation of a National Air 
Force: The Official History of the Royal 
Canadian Air Force, Vol. II.8 
This chapter related a significant story that 
had never before been pieced together. Because 
of the shortage of naval escorts owing to the huge 
demands of the convoy system on the North 
American coast and across the Atlantic, Eastern 
Air Command of the RCAF had accepted, at the 
navy's reques t , a major sha r e of the 
responsibility for the defence of shipping in the 
gulf. In the wake of the heavy losses of ships in 
late August and early September 1942, 
moreover, Eastern Air Command had removed 
aircraft from Atlantic duties to concentrate as 
many as 48 front-line anti-submarine bombers 
in the gulf and its ocean approaches,9 including 
a large detachment of bombers that operated 
from the Mont Joli air base. These aircraft, 
al though they did not sink any U-boats, 
repeatedly sighted and attacked U-517, the most 
successful of the submarines, and prevented the 
U-boat from achieving any more successes 
during the last three weeks of its mission in the 
St. Lawrence. Moreover, research in German 
archives, greatly assisted by Professor Michael 
Hadley10 who collaborated with the air force 
historians, revealed that more U-boats had 
followed U-517 into the St. Lawrence than had 
previously been believed, and stayed for a much 
longer period of time. U-43, U-106, U-69 and 
U-518 all made patrols of two weeks or more in 
September to November 1942, but nevertheless 
together sank only three vessels, as compared 
to the eighteen sunk by U-553, U-132, U-165 
and U-517 in May to September. The reduction 
in shipping traffic only partly accounted for the 
meagre results of the continued German effort. 
Ships still sailed, both independently and in 
convoys, but the air patrols were so intense that 
the U-boats did not dare run on the surface long 
enough to sight and chase the merchant vessels. 
Indeed, the captain of a fifth submarine assigned 
to follow up U-517's successes in the gulf, U-183, 
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St. Lawrence Convoy by Commander Harold Thomas Beament 
was so intimidated by the air patrols off Sydney 
that he decided it was too dangerous to enter.'' 
The air force research also turned up crucial 
information on Canadian naval intelligence that 
had still been classified when the naval 
historians had published in the early 1950s. 
Since the beginning of the war naval radio 
stations and other government radio stations 
operating under naval instructions, had been 
taking directional bearings on transmissions by 
German warships and sending these bearings 
to British naval intelligence. By plotting these 
bearings together with others on the same 
transmissions by radio stations in Britain, 
Iceland and the Caribbean, British naval 
intelligence could estimate the approximate 
position of the transmitting warship. By mid-
1942, the Canadian navy had developed its own 
plotting and analysis capabilities, and begun 
quickly to pass estimated positions of U-boats 
transmitting in Canadian coastal waters to 
Eastern Air Command so that aircraft could 
immediately search the areas. In September 
1942 the navy and the air force began to apply 
this system in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. One of 
the Lockheed Hudson bomber units transferred 
at that time from Atlantic coast stations into the 
gulf was 113 Squadron, which had led the way 
in using the navy's plots of estimated U-boat 
positions to concentrate air patrols in the most 
promising areas. It was 113 Squadron aircraft, 
using this system, that repeatedly attacked 
U-517 and thereby brought an end to its success. 
Other squadrons followed this example, with the 
result that the four U-boats that followed U-517 
seldom dared remain on the surface because 
aircraft were so constantly overhead. 
As a result of these discoveries during the 
preparation of the air force history, the St 
Lawrence battle became a focal point of research 
for a new official history of the navy on which a 
small team began to work in the late 1980s. The 
Second World War volume was about two-thirds 
of the way to completion when the deep 
government cutbacks of 1993-96 brought the 
project nearly to a halt. Cuts in the Directorate 
of History from 32 personnel to ten left only two 
of the five naval historians on staff. Dr. Serge 
Bernier became director in these difficult times. 
Despite many competing pressures and the 
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extreme shortage of staff, he organized the 
production in 1997-8 of Canada and the Battle 
of the Atlantic, which featured a chapter on the 
St. Lawrence with new naval information that 
built on the results of the air force project. This 
moderately-sized book was designed to make 
some of the most important parts of the naval 
research available to the public until the full 
naval history could be completed, a date that at 
that time seemed far in the future. 
In 1999, however, the department of National 
Defence supported the revival of the naval history 
project. The first of these large volumes was 
recently published and includes a chapter of 
some 50 printed pages on the St. Lawrence 
battle.12 
There are two particularly interesting areas 
in which the new work contributes to broader 
understanding of the St. Lawrence battle. The 
first is to establish more clearly the strategic 
context. The St. Lawrence battle was only one 
part of the large-scale U-boat offensive into North 
American coastal waters that began in January 
1942, after the entry of the United States into 
the war in December 1941; previously Hitler had 
banned U-boat attacks west of Newfoundland for 
fear of triggering American belligerence. The new 
book shows in detail that the main weight of the 
initial German assault-by 14 of the 17 U-boats 
that crossed the Atlantic - fell in Newfoundland 
and Canadian waters, but that the Canadian 
forces, despite shortages of ships, aircraft, 
t ra ined personnel and equipment , were 
successful in defending shipping. Most of the 
shipping losses were among unconvoyed ships, 
that is ships that were sailing alone without 
immediate protection, and the Canadian navy 
very rapidly established coastal convoys between 
Canadian, Newfoundland and, subsequently, 
northern US ports. Any and every naval escort 
was pressed into service, and these convoys often 
sailed under the protection of only one or two 
small warships. Nevertheless, the U-boats soon 
shifted the weight of their assault to the US coast, 
as far south as Florida, and then into the 
Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. The US Navy did 
not establish coastal convoys, incorrectly 
believing that the small number of escorts then 
available could not provide sufficient protection, 
and that the convoys would merely create 
clustered targets for the enemy. The U-boats, 
however, as events in Canadian waters proved, 
had no wish to take the time and run the risks 
necessary to find and attack convoys. German 
policy was to sink as much shipping as possible 
with the least possible danger of counterattack, 
and that made independently sailed ships the 
target of choice. During the first eight months of 
1942, the Germans were thus able to destroy 
over 100 ships per month along the US coast. 
Canadian defence planners had always 
worried - in the First World War, and when war 
threatened again in the late 1930s - that such a 
submarine assault on the North American coast 
would inevitably extend into the St. Lawrence. 
Every winter during the Second World War the 
navy drew up detailed plans as to what measures 
could be taken in the St. Lawrence with the 
warships and maritime aircraft actually available 
when the ice cleared and shipping again began 
to sail in the following spring. The great demands 
of the new coastal convoys early in 1942 left very 
little for such an emergency at the very time it 
seemed most likely. On the advice of the British 
Admiralty (which itself had contributed a large 
number of British escorts to help out in 
Newfoundland, Canadian and US waters) that 
all escorts were urgently needed on the Atlantic 
routes, the navy assigned only a small number 
of Bangor minesweepers and wooden Fairmile 
motor patrol craft to the Gulf. Many of these were 
newly-built vessels that would not complete until 
the spring and summer of 1942. Given the 
shortage of resources, the naval staff also 
decided that convoys would not be organized in 
the gulf until merchant ships had actually been 
sunk there, and further decided that if the lightly 
escorted convoys suffered serious losses to the 
submarines, it would be wiser to close the gulf 
to shipping than to divert escorts from the 
critically important Atlantic routes. 
The navy received intelligence that a U-boat 
might be in the Gulf the day before the attacks 
on Leto and Nicoya, and requested the air force 
to begin to patrol in pursuit of the submarine. 
When the destruction of the two ships confirmed 
that a U-boat was present and active, the navy 
and air force swiftly implemented the plans 
made the preceding winter. All shipping was held 
in port for a few days until defended convoys 
could be organized, and the air force greatly 
increased its patrols; these measures were 
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Sailors from a merchant ship torpedoed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence are provided 
with "survivor's bundles" by the Women's Naval Auxiliary Services, May 1942. 
effective and U-553 was unable to make any 
further attacks on shipping. 
At this same time, the pressures on the 
limited pool of escorts increased even more. 
During the spring of 1942 U-boat attacks on 
tanker traffic in southern US waters virtually cut 
off the supply of crude oil from the Caribbean 
to refineries at Montreal and Halifax; much of 
eastern Canada, including the ship refuelling 
facilities at Halifax and St. J o h n ' s , 
Newfoundland, depended upon the production 
of these refineries. The Canadian naval staff 
therefore pulled two escorts from Atlantic convoy 
service to run special tanker convoys to and from 
the Caribbean. This was a success, in part 
because the tanker convoys did not have to make 
the week-long run from Halifax up the St. 
Lawrence; in 1941 an oil pipeline had opened 
between Portland, Maine and Montreal. 
The British and Americans agreed that 
Canada could redeploy a total of six ocean 
escorts - corvettes - from the Atlantic routes on 
a long term basis for regular tanker escort duty 
to the Caribbean, with the intention that they 
should escort British as well as Canadian 
tankers. Just as the new Tanker Escort Force 
was assembling at Halifax, U-132 entered the 
Gulf and made determined, successful attacks 
on the weakly-escorted convoys. The Canadian 
naval staff, despite the contrary advice of the 
British and Americans, immediately began to 
deploy the tanker escorts into the gulf to 
strengthen the defences of the convoys there, and 
scaled back the size of the tanker convoys to the 
Caribbean. When, in September, U-517 and 
U-165 made still heavier attacks in the gulf, the 
Canadian naval staff pulled additional escorts 
from the Atlantic routes, including two British 
destroyers that were operating under Canadian 
control; it was at this time that Eastern Air 
Command made large-scale redeployments of 
aircraft from coastal stations into the gulf. Far 
from ignoring the St. Lawrence defences in the 
gulf, as anxious Members of Parliament and 
journalists charged, the Canadian forces defied 
the priorities of the Allied high command in 
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order to strengthen the defences as much as was 
humanly possible. 
On 9 September 1942, as losses in the gulf 
convoys were continuing to increase despite the 
recent reinforcements, the Canadian government 
closed the gulf to ocean shipping on the advice 
of the naval staff. Thus, it seemed, the gulf had 
proved indefensible with the resources available, 
and the navy was doing what had always been 
provided for in the plans. 
Allied priorities for escort deployments 
changed at this time, however, as did the whole 
organization of shipping defence in North 
American waters. It was, in fact, these changes 
that brought the closure of the gulf, although 
the recent heavy losses undoubtedly influenced 
the decision. The immediate reason for the 
decision to close the gulf was a personal appeal 
from Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great 
Britain to Canada's prime minister, William Lyon 
Mackenzie King, asking that Canada provide as 
many as 16 corvettes to help protect the troop 
and supply convoys that would carry British and 
US forces for the invasion of North Africa 
planned for early November 1942. This was the 
first western Allied land offensive against the 
Axis powers, and it was the most urgent and 
pressing war operation. 
Closure of the gulf was the most immediately 
practical method of freeing up escorts to provide 
these corvettes because Canadian, British and 
US shipping authorities had already agreed, in 
August, that the huge losses of Allied shipping 
in US waters could only be stopped by greatly 
curtailing shipping to and from Canadian ports, 
and making New York the focal point for the 
shipment of supplies from North America to 
Britain. The Canadian tanker convoys to the 
Caribbean had helped to show that even lightly 
escorted convoys along the US coast would 
greatly reduce the number of German attacks, 
but experience had demonstrated that the 
coastal convoy system would have to be 
comprehensive. As the US forces had gradually 
improved defences along the Atlantic seaboard 
in the spring and early summer of 1942, the 
U-boats had simply shifted further south to the 
heavily travelled and still weakly protected 
This photo was taken from a Lockheed Hudson of 
113 (Br) Squadron during an attack on U-165 on 9 
September 1942 just south of Anticosti Island. 
waters of the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. 
Escorts were still not available in sufficient 
numbers to implement such a large system of 
new convoys without economies somewhere, and 
all authorities agreed those economies had to 
come in Canadian waters. 
Since the entry of the US into the war the 
proportion of North American shipping carrying 
supplies to Great Britain that sailed from US 
ports had completely outstripped the amount 
that sailed from Canada's Atlantic ports and the 
St. Lawrence. It was therefore much more 
economical, in terms of escorts, to bring the 
relatively small number of ships from Canadian 
ports south to New York, than to continue to 
escort very large numbers of ships north from 
US ports for transatlantic convoy assembly at 
Halifax and Sydney, Nova Scotia. In August-
September , as Br i t i sh and US escor t s 
implemented a complete system of coastal 
convoys on the US coast and in the Caribbean 
and Gulf of Mexico (with the Canadian tanker 
escorts also participating), New York replaced 
the Nova Scotia ports as the assembly point for 
transatlantic convoys. The RCN was able assume 
full responsibility for the escort of the big 
transatlantic convoys from New York because it 
was no longer necessary to move so many ships 
between Canadian ports and to and from 
northern US ports: as the main transatlantic 
convoys sailed north from New York, groups of 
merchant ships that had loaded at Canadian 
ports simply sailed out and joined under local 
escort of small numbers of warships that had 
only to make a short shuttle out and back from 
Halifax and Sydney. In short, the decision to 
close the St. Lawrence was driven by the needs 
for escorts for the invasion of North Africa, and 
even more so by the need to stop losses in the 
Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean than by successes 
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of U-517 and U-l65 in the St. Lawrence. In July 
to September the U-boats sank 16 vessels in the 
St. Lawrence river and gulf; in those same 
months the enemy destroyed 104 vessels in the 
Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.13 There was more 
than a little of truth in the statement Angus L. 
Macdonald made in the House of Commons in 
March 1943: 
I say that the battle of the St. Lawrence has not 
been lost... .of the total tonnage which used the 
river and the gulf last year, only three out of every 
thousand tons was sunk...I know the general 
average of convoy sinkings throughout the world, 
and I can say that if you only lose three tons out 
of every thousand which you have at sea you are 
doing pretty well, in fact somewhat better than 
average. We have not lost the battle of the gulf. 
Some people t h i n k the gulf is easi ly 
defended....Let them remember that the St. 
Lawrence river, at the point farthest inland where 
an attack was made last year, is thirty miles wide. 
That is almost like the open sea.14 
Yet, despi te these brave words , the 
government and the armed forces did regard the 
battle in the St. Lawrence as a defeat. It was that 
sense of defeat at the end of 1942 that informed 
the original official histories, quoted above, that 
were published in the early 1950s. 
The new official history seeks to explain why, 
when the armed forces had energetically 
executed well-conceived plans, effectively 
suppressed the U-boats in the gulf after mid-
September, and all the while contributed to much 
larger and more important Allied objectives, 
there was such a sense of defeat. This is the 
second area of investigation that might be of 
general interest. 
In the St. Lawrence, as was not fully 
understood at the time, the Canadian forces 
faced conditions that were extraordinarily 
favourable to submarines, and extraordinarily 
difficult for defending forces. Although 
Macdonald was right that the gulf and estuary 
of the St. Lawrence are inland seas, there are 
also choke points, in the Cabot Straits, between 
the Gaspe Peninsula and Anticosti Island, and 
in the river west of the Gaspe Peninsula. These 
choke points force shipping to follow standard 
routes, and thus made it easy for submarines to 
locate convoys, whose best protection on the 
open ocean was the extreme difficulty 
submarines had in finding them. At the same 
time, the broad and deep waters of the St. 
Lawrence enabled submarines quickly to escape 
once they had attacked a convoy. Canadian 
aircraft and escorts carried primitive radar or 
no radar at all for detection of U-boats that fled 
at speed on the surface, and, more than was 
appreciated at the time, the complex layering of 
cold seawater and warm river water blinded the 
asdic (sonar) then available for underwater 
detection. Given these conditions, it was not 
surprising that convoys protected by escorts that 
were either weak, or comprised of larger 
numbers of warships that had been hastily 
assembled with no chance to achieve proper 
coordination, suffered heavy losses. The 
imperfect unde r s t and ing in 1942 of the 
challenges of defending shipping in coastal 
waters like the gulf, meant that the losses 
experienced - which included two RCN escorts 
and a USN troopship - were scarcely less 
demoralizing for the armed forces than they were 
for the population on shore. 
The success of closer naval-air cooperation 
starting in mid-September 1942, moreover, was 
not apparent at the time. Encouraging as were 
the initial string of air attacks (and a surface 
escort attack) on the unusually bold U-517, 
thereafter the Canadian forces never got even a 
glimpse of the enemy. Because the Allies were 
unable to decrypt German U-boat radio signals 
in 1942, no one realized that four U-boats made 
long patrols in the gulf in October to November, 
and that the defences had all but paralyzed these 
submarines while persuading a fifth not to 
venture past the Cabot Straits. 
Although the U-boats succeeded in sinking 
only three ships after mid-September, these 
included two of the most dramatic losses: the 
steamer Carolus, sunk furthest upriver of all the 
losses, close off Metis Beach; and, in the Cabot 
Strait, the Newfoundland ferry Caribou. Both 
were destroyed by U-69, and this boat, as we 
now know from German sources, had been 
driven to hide beneath the surface in deep 
narrow waters and attack only ships that passed 
close by under cover of dark nights because of 
the strength of the defences along the main 
shipping routes. Unfortunately, these dramatic 
successes in October - the parting shots of the 
U-boats as they retreated from the St Lawrence 
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- coincided with the publication of a series of 
articles by the Quebec journalist Edouard 
Laurent under the title "Ce qui se passe en 
Gaspesie," which reported in powerful terms the 
alarm of the population, and their conviction that 
they had been abandoned by their governments 
in the face of the enemy. 
La guerre est tout proche de lui. Un bon nombre 
ont vu des sous-marins ennemis; d'autres ont 
ete les temoins de torplllages de navires allies; 
un plus grand nombre ont entendu dans le 
lointaln, le bruit de la canonnade. Ceux qui sont 
alles dans les hopitaux de region ont vu ou 
entendu parler des marins blesses qui se 
remettent de leurs blessures.... 
Ce qui augmente l'angoisse collective, c'est 
d'abord le silence du gouvernement sur tout ce 
qui se passe dans le bas du fleuve. Les gens de 
la Gaspesie savent bien que si le gouvernement 
exposait la veritable situation, l'opinion publique 
reagirait assez virgoureusement pour exiger une 
action plus efficace de la part des authorites...15 
It was these articles that brought Premier 
Godbout to alert Mackenzie King to the urgent 
need to address the concerns of the population 
in the region, which in turn brought the 
government to increase pressure upon the armed 
forces to investigate what had gone wrong in 
1942 and prepare detailed plans for greatly 
improved measures in 1943. Godbout's warning 
stimulated the government's own efforts to reply 
more vigorously to critics with much fuller 
information about events in the gulf. The 
government also directed the armed forces to 
work closely with provincial and municipal 
authorities in all the areas around the lower river 
and gulf to provide better information to the 
coastal populations and enlist their cooperation 
in keeping a sharp watch and reporting anything 
suspicious along those isolated shores. This 
programme was a central part of the military 
planning for 1943, together with the assignment 
of many additional escort warships and bomber 
aircraft to the gulf. Yet no U-boats returned to 
hunt in the St. Lawrence in 1943, because, as 
we now know, the improved Canadian defences 
during the fall of 1942 had persuaded the U-boat 
command tha t the gulf was no longer a 
promising area for attacks on shipping. 
Paradoxically, the destruction of U-517 by 
British forces in the eastern Atlantic in November 
1942, and the capture of Kapitanleutnant Paul 
Hartwig and most of h is crew, fur ther 
contributed to the sense of defeat among the 
senior levels of the Canadian forces, and their 
determination to strengthen the gulf defences in 
1943. Hartwig and his men spoke freely of their 
exploits and of their narrow escapes from the 
repeated, and often hair-raising, counterattacks 
by Canadian aircraft and warships. Most of what 
they said could be confirmed from Canadian 
action reports, and both British and Canadian 
officers were deeply impressed that the German 
submariners had had the confidence to persist 
in the face of such determined opposition. If it 
was this difficult to deter German submariners, 
then there was every reason to expect renewed 
attacks in the St. Lawrence in 1943 that would 
be as least as heavy as those spearheaded by 
Hartwig. 
When the first official histories of the navy 
appeared in 1950 and 1952, it was the exploits 
of U-517 that largely accounted for the authors' 
conclusions that Canada had been dealt a defeat. 
The full German archives that included reports 
from the other submarines that had been forced 
continuously to hide immobile beneath the water 
and ultimately abandon the gulf were not yet 
available to the Canadian naval historians. They 
were only too aware of the gaps in the sources 
they had to work with and quite consciously laid 
the groundwork for additional research by later 
generations of official historians. In this sense, 
the belated appearance of the new official history 
of the navy is nevertheless the result of a 
successful passing of the baton. 
Perhaps the greatest value of the official 
histories is that they bring to bear the substantial 
resources needed to assemble and digest the vast 
and frequently obscure military and government 
archives. This specialized scholarship alone is 
not sufficient to bring meaning and currency to 
history. It is, however, an essential resource for 
others accurately to gather and analyze personal 
memories and artifacts, review archives with 
fresh eyes, preserve and interpret significant 
sites, and produce the memorials, exhibits, 
films, and books that, with new perspectives, 
keep history vital. 
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affected Canadian performance Is 
equally applicable to the Poles. 
Compounding all this was that the 
corps and divisional commanders 
(and their staffs) lacked situational 
awareness . To a degree, Simonds ' 
may have believed the end was in 
sight and failed to follow the battle 
as closely as he should. 
I find that historians often treat 
the Polish forces (and many other 
allied nations) during the Second 
World War as if they are gossiping 
about someone who is in the room 
with them, while pretending tha t 
p e r s o n I s n o t t h e r e . T h i s I s 
pa r t i cu l a r ly no t ewor thy in the 
l i tera ture a b o u t Normandy a n d 
especially t rue of Major-General 
S o s a b o w s k i a n d t h e P o l i s h 
P a r a c h u t e Brigade. I am often 
surprised at the shoddy or limited 
research, especially in this case, 
where for most of August 1944, the 
Polish division played a key role. 
Source material is a b u n d a n t and 
no t t h a t difficult to find. The 
National Archives of Canada holds 
a n u m b e r of critical documen t s 
regard ing 1st Polish Armoured 
Division pre-invasion training and 
operations in Normandy, while a 
n u m b e r o f E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e 
p u b l i c a t i o n s d e s c r i b e t h e i r 
operations in greater detail. The 
Sikorski Institute in London holds 
a g o l d m i n e of u n t a p p e d 
documentat ion. History is about 
pinning down facts and treating a 
significant player, such as the 1 st 
Polish Armoured Division, solely 
through third party comments still 
leaves u s w i thou t a n a c c u r a t e 
p o r t r a y a l o f t h e N o r m a n d y 
campaign. 
Please also note the caption on 
p a g e 1 6 i s n o t c o r r e c t . T h e 
individual in the photo is not a 
"trooper" b u t actually a capta in 
(indicated by the three s tars on his 
beret) from the 10th Mounted Rifle 
R e g i m e n t , t h e d i v i s i o n a l 
reconnaissance regiment of the 1st 
Polish Armoured Division. 
Finally, the au thor points out, 
quite correctly, many British and 
Canad ian commander s s u c h a s 
Montgomery, S imonds , Kitching 
a n d o t h e r s l a c k e d " a r m o u r e d 
t ra ining or a rmoured c o m m a n d 
exper ience." Among those with 
exper ience w a s Major -Genera l 
Stanlslaw Maczek, who wiuh his tiny 
armoured brigade, fought a spirited 
d e f e n c e a g a i n s t two G e r m a n 
divisions in 1939, commanded an 
a r m o u r e d br igade in France in 
1 9 4 0 a n d led t h e 1s t P o l i s h 
Armoured Division between 1943 
and 1945. 
Yours sincerely, 
J o h n R. Grodzinski, Major 
Managing Editor 
The Army Doctrine 




Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol12/iss2/4
